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INTRODUCTION
ane was a forty-year-old drug addict from rural Kentucky. She had two
children under the age often and one son, John, who was twenty. Jane had
suffered severe brain trauma and was declared to be in persistent vegetative
state by the time she was transferred from her regional hospital to the
University of Kentucky Chandler Medical Center. John knew his mother
would not have wanted to live like this, and after applying substituted
judgment, requested that life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn. There
was only one problem. Jane was six weeks pregnant, and under Kentucky
law, even if Jane had expressly written out what her wishes were, once she
had come to lack decisional capacity, such a directive is deemed ineffective
in the instance of a pregnant woman. As a result, Jane was kept alive for
thirty-six weeks so that the fetus could be brought to term.'
Beginning with the landmark New Jersey Supreme Court case, In re
Quinlan, state courts have generally held that incompetent individuals
may, through substituted judgment, decline unwanted medical treatment.3
These state court decisions culminated in the 1990 Supreme Court decision,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, wherein the Court, in a 5-4
decision, held it was permissible for a state trial court to require clear and
convincing evidence of a patient's wishes before life-sustaining treatment
could be withdrawn from an incompetent person.
4
Post-Quinlan, as state courts began recognizing the right of an
incompetent to withdraw life-sustaining treatment through their
I J.D. expected, May 2012, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. in Political Sci-
ence, summa cum laude, May 2oo9, Eastern Kentucky University. The author would like to
thank Professor Nicole Huberfeld for her guidance and helpful insight on living will and
advance directive acts.
2 Dr. Sara Rozenthal, Dir., Univ. of Ky. Program for Bioethics and Patients' Rights,
Speech to Professor Nicole Huberfeld's Fall 201o Bioethical Issues in the Law Class (Nov. 16,
2010) (transcript on file with author).
3 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.zd 647,664 (N.J. 1976).
4 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990).
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surrogates, and even more so after the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan,
state legislatures began enacting living will or advance directive acts which
allow individuals to spell out exactly what their wishes are if they are ever
to be found in an incompetent state.' Currently, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia have enacted living will or advance directive acts in
some form.6 Of these fifty-one jurisdictions, only fifteen are silent as to
the effectiveness of such provisions if a patient is found to be pregnant.'
5 See Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or Individual?: The Legal and Policy Dficiencies of Preg-
nancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Care Directive Statutes, 54 MD. L. REV. 528,
531-32 (1995).
6 See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-I to 22-8A-14 (LexisNexis zoo6); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.52.010
to 13.52.395 (20o0); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-32OI to 36-3297 (2OO9); ARK. CODE ANN. §§
20-17-201 to 20-17-218 (2005); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4670 to 4701(West 2009); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 15-18-1OI to 15-18-113 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to 19a-58og (West
zoio); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 tO 2518 ( 2003 & Supp. 2oo); D.C. CODE §§ 7-601
to 7-630 (LexisNexis 2oo8); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101 tO 765.404 (West 20o); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 31-32-14 (2009); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 327E-i to 327E-16 (Supp. 2007);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-4501 to 39-4515 (2011); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 tO 35/10 (West
2007); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-36-4-1 to 16-36-4-21 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 2009); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ i44A.i to i44A.12 (West 2005 & Supp. 201) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,1O tO
65-28,109 (2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.621 to 311.643 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1299.58.1 tO 40:1299.58.10 (2oo8); ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 'I8-A, §§ 5-802 to 5-817 (1998 &
SUpp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5--601 to 5-618 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. zoI D, §§ I to 17 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 700.5501 to 700.5520
(West 2002 & Supp. 201i); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.oi to 145B.17 (West 2011); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-41-201 to 41-41-229 (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to 459.055 (West
2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to 50-9-2O6 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-401 to 20-416
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.535 to 449.690 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 137-:1 to 137-:23
(LexisNexis Supp. 20o); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to 26:2H-78 (West 2007); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to 24-7A-1 7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980 to
2994 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 tO 90-323 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
23-06.5-01 to 23-O6.5-18 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01 to 2133.15 (LexisNexis
2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.1 tO 3101.16 (West Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§
127.505 tO 127.660, 127.995 (2009); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5401 to 5416 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2o1); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.11-1 to 23-4.11-15 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-Io
to 44-77-,60 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS H 34-12D-I to 34-12D-22 (1994); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to 32-11-113 (2007); T~x. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.031 to
166.053 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. 88 75-2a-1o1 to 75-2a-125 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.18, §§ 9700 to 9720 (Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2981 to 54.1-2993
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 70-122.010 to 70.-122.920 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ i6-30I
to 16-30-13 (LexisNexis 2011); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to 154.30 (West Supp. 2010); WYo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-401 to 35-22-416 (Supp. 2011).
7 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4670 to 4701(West 2009); D.C. CODE § 7-621 to 7-630 (Lex-
isNexis 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327E-i to 327E-16 (Supp. 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1299.58.1 to 40:1299.58.io (2008); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. i8-A, §§ 5-802 to 5-817 (998
& Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, §§ I to 17 (West 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
41-41-209 to 41-41-229 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-i to 24-7A-17 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2009); N.Y PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980 tO 2994 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
90-320 to 90-323 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.505 to 127.660, 127.995 (2009); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-11-101 tO 32-11-113 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54. 1-2981 to 54.1-2993 (2009); W.
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Twelve states completely stay the effectiveness of a living will or directive
in the instance of a pregnant woman,' twelve stay the living will or
directive if a fetus is viable-or live birth would be possible with continued
life-sustaining treatment,9 and five do so unless life-sustaining treatment
would not have the effect of allowing the fetus to continue to live birth,
such treatment would be physically harmful to the woman, or such action
would prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated with medication. 1
Five of the remaining seven jurisdictions leave the determination as to
the effectiveness of a directive in a pregnancy scenario completely to the
discretion of the female patient," while the last two jurisdictions impose
a rebuttable presumption that a female patient would not want life-
sustaining treatment withdrawn were she found to be pregnant."
The history of living wills in Kentucky began with the Kentucky Court
of Appeal's determination that it is permissible for substituted judgment to
be used to make decisions for incompetent persons. 3 In Strunk v. Strunk,
the court was asked to determine whether a kidney could be removed from
an incompetent, 28 year-old ward of the state for the benefit of his brother. 4
The court noted that "[t]he right to act for the incompetent in all cases has
become recognized in this country as the doctrine of substituted judgment
and is broad enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters
touching on the well-being of the ward."'5 Kentucky subsequently enacted
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-30-2 to 16-30-13 (LexisNexis 2011); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-401 to
35-22-416 (2011).
8 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (LexisNexis 2oo6); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § I9a-574 (West
2011 ); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.5512(1) (West Supp. 2O1O); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-77-70 (2002); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.o69 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2a-12 3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 7 0.122.030(I)(d) (2oo8); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § I54.03 (West Supp. 2010).
9 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.055 (2o 10); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(C) (2005); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (201o); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I6, § 25030) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-
32-4 (2009); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/3(C) (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 14A.6 (West 2005);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9--202(C) (2009); NED. REV. STAT. § 20-408(3) (2007); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 449.624(4) (2009); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2133.o6(B) (LexisNexis 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-4.1 1-6(c) (2008).
iO See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629(4) (West 2O I); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 13 7 -J:i0 (Lex-
isNexis Supp. 2OLO); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-09 (2002); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5471
(West Supp. 201 1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-io (1994).
II See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (Supp. 201o); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (West
2010); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (LexisNexis 2oo9); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-56
(West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702 (Supp. 2O1O).
12 See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145C.10(g) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.4
(West 201O).
13 See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.zd 145, 145 (Ky. 1969).
14 See id.
15 Id. at 148.
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its first Living Will Directive Act in 1990,16 and in 1993, the Supreme Court
of Kentucky analyzed the effect of the Act,17 holding in DeGrella v. Elston
that life-sustaining medical treatment could be withdrawn from a patient
in a persistent vegetative state in light of the patient's prior statements
that she would not have wanted to be kept alive by artificial means."5 In
1994, a new Living Will Directive Act replaced the 1990 Act. 19 This Act
allows an individual to designate a surrogate to make healthcare decisions
on the individual's behalf, provides that the individual may give directions
for the withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging treatment, including
artificially provided nutrition or hydration, and provides a model form for
writing out these directions."0 The pregnancy exemption provision can be
found in the model form and states, "[ilf I have been diagnosed as pregnant
and that diagnosis is known to my attending physician, this directive shall
have no force or effect during the course of my pregnancy."'" Although no
litigation has been directed at the pregnancy exemption clause itself, in
2004 the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Woods v. Commonwealth, upheld
the Kentucky Living Will Directive Act.1
2
The goal of this note is to argue the constitutional infirmity of the
pregnancy exemption clause in the Kentucky Living Will Directive Act
and similar legislation enacted in other states staying the effect of advance
directives in the instance of a pregnant woman. Part I of the note looks
at the constitutionality of pregnancy exemptions from the standpoint of
the right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Part II analyzes the constitutionality of
such provisions from the perspective of a pregnant woman's reproductive
rights, arguing that pregnancy exemptions effectively violate these rights
as established by Roe v. Wade and its progeny.
i6 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.972 (repealed 1994).
17 See DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 706-08 (Ky. 1993).
j8 See id. at 707-10.
19 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.623 to 311.6z5 (West 2o1I).
20 Id. § 311.623, 311.625.
21 Id. § 311.625; see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (West 201o) (providing that not-
withstanding the execution of an advance directive, in the instance of a pregnant woman, pro-
vision of life sustaining treatment shall be made unless it is determined to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty that such procedures will not maintain the female patient in a manner
permitting continuing development and live birth of the unborn child, such treatment will be
physically harmful to the woman, or such treatment will prolong severe pain which cannot be
alleviated by medication).
22 Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24,42 (Ky. 2004).
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I. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE UNWANTED MEDICAL TREATMENT/THE RIGHT TO
DIE
A. Development of the Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment
The so-called "right to die" developed from the common law
presumption that competent individuals have the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment. 3 State courts have long recognized the right of an
individual to decline to partake in unwanted procedures, reasoning "each
man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of
sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or
other medical treatment."2 4 The state courts have often found such a right
of refusal in what has been deemed a common law right to be free from
unwanted bodily intrusion as well as the common law crimes of assault and
battery.2 5 Additionally, courts have looked to the common law doctrine of
informed consent to support their holdings that a person has the right to
refuse medical treatment.2 6 In In re Quinlan, the landmark "right to die"
state case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey expressly found that the "right
[to privacy] 7 is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy
under certain conditions."2" In re Quinlan involved a family's request that
the respirator keeping their daughter, Karen, alive be removed so that she
could be allowed to die. 9 After finding that a right to privacy encompasses
the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, the court balanced this
right against the state's interest in preserving human life, holding that "the
23 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243 (D.C. 199o) (en banc) ("[Olur analysis of this case
begins with the tenet common to all medical treatment cases: that any person has the right to
make an informed choice, if competent to do so, to accept or forego medical treatment. The
doctrine of informed consent, based on this principle and rooted in the concept of bodily
integrity, is ingrained in our common law.").
24 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.zd 1o93, I IO4 (Kan. 196o).
25 Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682-83 (Ariz. 1983) (providing that the basis of
the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment derived from the common law right to be free
from bodily invasion); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment derived from the common
law right to be free from unwanted intrusion).
26 Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.zd 821, 831-32 (Conn. 1996) (stating that the right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment is reflected in the common law doctrine of informed
consent).
27 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965) (citation omitted) ("The forego-
ing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy.").
28 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,663 (N.J. 1976).
29 See id. at 647.
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State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims."30 In
Quinlan's case the court found "the degree of bodily invasion ... so great
and the prognosis so poor.., that Karen [Quinlan] would have the right to
refuse treatment."
3 1
The Supreme Court of the United States has also come to recognize an
individual's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. As early as 1891,
the Court held in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford that "[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others. ' 3 In the earliest cases
recognizing such a right, the Court was primarily faced with the chore of
deciding whether or not individuals could be forcibly vaccinated.3 3 From
these prior decisions, the Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health inferred a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment."3 4 The Court determined that under this
liberty interest, Cruzan had the right to have unwanted nutrition and
hydration removed even if her "life" depended upon it.3" In a concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor declared "the liberty [interest] guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's
deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial
delivery of food and water. ' 36 In a pair of companion cases in 1997, the
Court reaffirmed its recognition of a patient's constitutional right to refuse
or terminate unwanted medical treatment even if it is of a life-saving
nature.37 In Vacco v. Quill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
pronounced "[elveryone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if
competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. "38
As for an incompetent person's right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, the Supreme Court in Cruzan assumed, at least for the purposes
of that case, that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment held
by a competent person was also held by an incompetent patient.39 In her
30 Id. at 664.
31 Joan Mahoney, Death with Dignity: Is There an Exception for Pregnant Women?, 57 UMKC
L. REV. 221, 223 (1989) (citing In Re Quinlan, 355 A.zd at 664).
32 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
33 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (199o); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905).
34 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (199o).
35 See id. at 279.
36 Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793,
807 (997).
38 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 8oo.
39 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 28o.
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concurrence, Justice O'Connor explained "[a] seriously ill or dying patient
whose wishes are not honored may feel a captive of the machinery required
for life-sustaining treatment or other medical interventions. Such forced
treatment may burden that individual's liberty interests as much as any
state coercion." 4° This declaration came well after the state courts had
discerned such a right for once competent patients.
41
1. Substantive Due Process and Balancing State Interests.-While in Cruzan the
Supreme Court recognized that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 4 under
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,43 and assumed for
the purposes of that case that such a right would also apply to incompetent
persons who were formerly competent,' it also acknowledged that such a
right is not absolute.4" The Court went on to note that "[allthough many
state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed
by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, [the Supreme Court has]
never so held." 46 In addition to holding that the State of Missouri could
require evidence of the incompetent's wishes regarding the withdrawal of
treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence, 47 the Court found
that in determining whether a person's constitutional rights had been
violated, the individual's liberty interest in withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment must be balanced against relevant state interests.
48
The four state interests generally balanced against an individual's
liberty interest include "the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide,
the protection of innocent third parties and the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession. ' 49 There is further agreement
40 Id. at z88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
41 See, e.g., In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 199o) ("[There is] no basis for drawing a
constitutional line between the protections afforded to competent persons and incompetent
persons."); In re Martin, 538 N.W.zd 399, 406 (Mich. 1992) (holding that an incompetent pa-
tient has the same right as a competent patient if that person has "made and communicated
... [their decision to refuse medical treatment] before losing the capacity to make further
choices"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
42 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
43 U.S. Corrsr. amend. XIV, § i.
44 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.zd at 664.
45 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (holding that "whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant
state interests" (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted))); id. at 28o (holding that the Constitution does not forbid a state to require
clear and convincing proof of the incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of treatment).
46 Id. at 279 n.7.
47 Seeid. at 28o-8i.
48 Id. at 279.
49 Hope E. Matchan & Kathryn E. Sheffield, Adding Constitutional Deprivation to Untimely
2011-20][2]
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that "in light of the fundamental importance and inviolability of bodily
integrity, the state interest must be compelling," in order for a state interest
to be found to outweigh an individual's liberty interest in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment. 50 In general, when it comes to a competent
individual's"1 informed decision to refuse medical treatment, the four core
state interests have to this point, not been found to prevail.5" Even so, it
is a valuable exercise to weigh these four state interests in the context of
a pregnant woman who has made the informed decision, via an advance
directive, to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn once she has lost
decisional capacity.
a. Sanctity of Life. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the state
has an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.' 13 While
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Cruzan, "[it cannot be disputed that
the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest
in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment,"' 4 the Court went on
to hold that in the context of the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
treatment, the state's interest is narrowed to a "more particular interest"
in "legitimately seek[ing] to safeguard the personal element of this choice
through the imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements.""5 In
determining that a formerly competent person may have life-sustaining
treatment withdrawn while at the same time allowing a state to require
the person's wishes to have such treatment withdrawn be established by
clear and convincing evidence, but not allowing the state to completely
proscribe such a decision, the Court impliedly held that a state's interest
in preserving the life of the individual was not sufficient to overcome a
person's right to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn.56
Death: South Dakota's Living Will Pregnancy Provision, 37 S.D. L. REv. 388,394 (1992) (footnotes
omitted); see Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb, andBodily Integrity, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 327,
343 (199I ) ("The asserted state interests may include the integrity and liability of the medi-
cal profession, protection of public morals, the interests of third parties (primarily dependant
minors) and, the most frequently cited reason, the preservation or sanctity of the life of the
patient." (footnotes omitted)).
50 Neff, supra note 49, at 343.
51 The Kentucky Living Will Directive Act, like most other advance directive acts, re-
quires that an individual be competent when he or she initially fills out a living will in order
for it to be effective. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.623 (West 201 I).
52 See Janice MacAvoy-Smitzer, Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 128o, 1289 (1987); Neff, supra note 49, at 346-47.
53 Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 1 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
55 Id.
56 See id. (where the Court specifically held that: "The choice between life and death is.
a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may
legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice through the imposition of
[Vol. 100
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Alternatively, one could argue that the preservation of the patient's life
is not implicated when dealing with whether or not an advance directive
should be followed, as most acts require that a person be in a "terminal
condition" before the directive can be put into effect.57 State courts have
held that the state's interest in life weakens when a patient is in a persistent
vegetative state, as medical treatment serves only to prolong the life of an
imminently dying person."8 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Cruzan, espouses
this proposition in quoting the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:
When we balance the State's interest in prolonging a patient's life
against the rights of the patient to reject such prolongation, we must
recognize that the State's interest in life encompasses a broader interest
than mere corporeal existence. In certain, thankfully rare, circumstances
the burden of maintaining the corporeal existence degrades the very
humanity it was meant to serve.59
The time at which an advance directive would be implemented is one
of those rare instances where the burden of maintaining the corporeal
existence degrades the very humanity it was meant to preserve.
An additional issue is whether or not the state, in having an interest in
the preservation of human life, also has an interest in the potential life of
the fetus carried by the pregnant woman. The Supreme Court has held
that an unborn fetus, whether viable or not, does not constitute a person,
i.e. a human life. 6° Even so, based on Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood
heightened evidentiary requirements. It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.").
57 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A- 4(d) (LexisNexis 2oo6) ("An advance directive for health-
care shall become effective when ... the declarant has either a terminal illness or injury or is in
a state of permanent unconsciousness."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-203 (2005) ("A declaration
becomes operative when ... (ii) the declarant is determined by the attending physician and
another physician in consultation either to be in a terminal condition and no longer able to
make decisions regarding administration of life-sustaining treatment or to be permanently
unconscious."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-57i(a) (West zolo) ("[A]ny licensed medical
facility who or which withholds ... a life support system ... shall not be liable for damages in
any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for such withholding..
provided ... (2) the attending physician deems the patient to be in a terminal condition...
."); IOWA CODE ANN. § i44A.30) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) ("The declaration shall be given
operative effect only if the declarant's condition is determined to be terminal and the declar-
ant is not able to make treatment decisions.").
58 See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 74i P2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987) ("Although the state's inter-
est in preserving life is justifiably strong, we believe this interest necessarily weakens and
must yield to the patient's interest where treatment at issue 'serves only to prolong a life
inflicted with an incurable condition."' (quoting In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983)
(en banc))).
59 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 345 n. I8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (Mass. 1986)).
60 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (holding that the word "person" as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn).
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, it appears the state does have a
compelling interest in the potential life of the fetus at least at the point
of viability.61 The issue, then, is whether or not a person's right to refuse
a medical procedure6 can ever be outweighed by the state's interest in
potential life. While there has been little case law speaking to this issue
specifically, at least one federal court of appeals has taken up the subject.
In In re A.C., the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated a former
decision that required a pregnant woman terminally ill with cancer to
undergo a cesarean delivery of her fetus. 63 The court held that a near-
death pregnant patient carrying a viable fetus, may, if competent, decide
whether or not to have a cesarean delivery and further, if she is found to be
incompetent, substituted judgment should be applied in deciding whether
to forgo the procedure. 64 The reasoning found in In re A.C. suggests that
a woman with a legally effective advance directive should be allowed to
direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment even if pregnant with a
viable fetus, as the state's interest in the potential life of that fetus does not
outweigh an individual's right to withdraw that treatment." Although In re
A.C. was seen "as a giant step forward in the fight to protect women's rights
... to refuse unwanted invasive medical procedures, 66 the court also noted
that "[w]e do not quite foreclose the possibility that a conflicting state
interest may be so compelling that the patient's wishes must yield, but we
anticipate that such cases will be extremely rare and truly exceptional."
' 67
Despite this caveat, the scenario described in In re A.C., suggests that the
potential life of the viable fetus would not constitute such a compelling
state interest.
b. Prevention of Suicide. The fact that the state holds an interest in
preventing suicide has never been more clearly stated than it was in the
61 See id. at 164-65 ("[S]ubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother."); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (con-
firming the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability).
62 This issue will be taken up infra.
63 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237-38 (D.C. 199o) (en banc); see also In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (upholding a patient's right to refuse a cesarean sec-
tion even though the health of the fetus was endangered as it was receiving an inadequate
supply of oxygen).
64 In reA.C., 573 A.zd at 1237.
65 Id. at 1252.
66 Amy Lynn Jerdee, Breaking Through the Silence: Minnesota's Pregnancy Presumption and
the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 971, 988 (zooo) (alteration in original)
(quoting Tracey E. Spruce, The Sound of Silence: Women s Voices in Medicine andLaw, 7 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 239, 245 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67 In re A.C., 573 A.2d. at 1252.
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Supreme Court's holdings in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill,
companion cases revolving around the issue of whether it is permissible
for a state to ban physician-assisted suicide.6 8 The Court in Glucksberg
determined:
While suicide is no longer prohibited or penalized, the ban against
assisted suicide and euthanasia shores up the notion of limits in human
relationships. It reflects the gravity with which we view the decision to
take one's own life or the life of another, and our reluctance to encourage
or promote these decisions.'
This sentiment was reiterated in Vacco as the Court noted the state's desire
to prevent suicide was among the valid and important public interests which
"easily satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification
bear a rational relation to some legitimate end."70  Nevertheless, this
interest does not seem to be implicated in the instance of enforcement
of an advance directive withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. In fact,
the Court has specifically distinguished between suicide and withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment." Disagreeing with the respondents' claims
that the distinction between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and
assisted suicide is "arbitrary" and "irrational," the Court in Vacco noted
that the Court has recognized "at least implicitly, the distinction between
letting a patient die and making that patient die."7" Drawing on their
reasoning in Cruzan, the Court held that the distinction is based on the
fact that the right to refuse treatment is not grounded on the "proposition
that patients have a general and abstract 'right to hasten death,' but on
well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from
unwanted touching."73 As such, no support exists for the "notion that
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment is 'nothing more nor less than
suicide."'74
c. Third Parties. In general, the state's interest in protecting "innocent third
parties" refers to situations where minor children are orphaned by the death
68 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 01997)-
69 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729.
70 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 809 (listing "prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; pre-
venting suicide; maintaining physicians' role as their patients' healers; protecting vulnerable
people from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their
lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia" as valid and important public interests
easily satisfying "the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational
relation to some legitimate end").
71 See id. at 807-o8.
72 Id. at 807.
73 Id. (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278-79 (1990) (O'Connor,




of their parent.75 The question remains whether or not this same concern
can be applied to an unborn fetus, which, under the Court's analysis in Roe
v. Wade does not constitute a human being.7" Because advance directive
acts generally require that a person be in a terminal condition" before a
directive removing life-sustaining treatment be carried out, it seems as
though this state interest is not highly implicated, regardless of whether or
not like concern for the upbringing of minor children is shown for unborn
fetuses. If the potential parent is "on their last leg," as seems to be the
scenario envisioned by most advanced directive statutes,78 a pregnancy
exemption does nothing to keep the child from being orphaned. Some
commentators have gone as far as to argue that "[p]regnancy clauses appear
to defeat this interest [in preventing minor children from being orphaned]
due to the fact that the fetus itself may be orphaned," and that "[i]t follows
that the recognition of the unconstitutionality of pregnancy clauses, and
therefore their abrogation, would in fact promote this -particular state
interest."7 9 In any event, it seems clear that a pregnancy exemption does
not further the protection of innocent third parties, at least as this interest
is traditionally understood.
d. Integrity of the Medical Profession. The Supreme Court, in Washington
v. Glucksberg, held that the state undoubtedly has an interest in protecting
the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.8" When it comes to living
wills, again, this interest is not usually implicated as most Acts provide
that physicians or health care providers are not subject to civil or criminal
liability for giving effect to advance directives.81 Assuming that the interest
is implicated, there does not seem to exist a sufficient relationship between
the infringement of a woman's right to have her advance directive carried
75 Matchan & Sheffield, supra note 49, at 404; see also President & Dirs. of Georgetown
Coll., Inc., 331 E2d Iooo, Ioo8 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
76 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, I58 (i973) ("All this, together with our observation,
supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices
were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.").
77 See supra note 57.
78 See supra note 6.
79 Matchan & Sheffield, supra note 49, at 404 (footnote omitted).
8o See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
8i See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-57I(a) (West 2011) ("[Alny licensed medical
facility who or which withholds ... a life support system ... shall not be liable for damages
in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for such withholding
... provided... (2) the attending physician deems the patient to be in a terminal condition
..... "); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D--13 (zolO) ("A physician or other health-care provider
is not subject to civil or criminal liability or to discipline for unprofessional conduct for giv-
ing effect to a declaration, absent actual knowledge of its revocation, for determining that a
terminal condition does or does not exist or for declining to give effect to a declaration under
§ 34-I2D-i I.").
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out and the protection of the medical professional's integrity. In Glucksberg,
the Court held that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally
incompatible with the physician's role as healer""2 and "could... undermine
the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship by blurring the
time-honored line between healing and harming."83 While Washington's
ban on physician-assisted suicide may be seen as rationally related to
this state interest," the pregnancy exemption in state advance directive
acts does not seem to meet such a minimum rationality test let alone the
strict scrutiny test which may be required by Cruzan.8s Although the Court
determined that physician-assisted suicide "could... undermine the trust
that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship," 6 it does not appear that
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment itself in any way compromises
this trust.87
Effectuating a pregnancy exemption could have just the opposite effect
of undermining the trust established between a patient and physician. For
instance, assume Jane, the female in the introductory anecdote, had created
an advance directive in which she specifically noted that she wished to have
life-sustaining treatment withdrawn if she were to fall into a persistent
vegetative state, regardless of whether or not she were pregnant at the time.
Jane, in order to ensure that her wishes are carried out, would likely provide
a copy of this advance directive to her physician so that it may be included
in her medical file. Jane would also likely verbally express her wishes to
her physician, trusting that he or she would ensure that her wishes would
be carried out were she to fall into a persistent vegetative state. In a state
where a pregnancy exemption exists, as is the case in Kentucky, the trust
Jane would have undoubtedly held for her physician to carry out the terms
of her directive would be worthless as the physician would be stayed from
carrying out Jane's wishes.
An additional concern regarding the integrity of the medical profession
82 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731 (alteration in original) (quoting AM. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF
ETHICS § 2.211 (1994)).
83 Id. (citing Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Io4th Cong. 355-56 (1996) (statement of Dr. Leon R.
Kass) ("The patient's trust in the doctor's whole-hearted devotion to his best interests will
be hard to sustain.")).
84 See id. at 735 (holding that Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably
related to the promotion and protection of the four state rights).
85 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (i99 o ) ("But for purposes
of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."); id. at 289
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
86 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
87 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265-81 (noting that the Court assumes a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving medical care without mentioning a competing state
interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession).
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is implicated when the effect of following an advance directive is the
destruction of a potential life. Most of the law discerning whether or not
limitations on the destruction of a fetus can ever be held sufficiently related
to the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession
to justify infringement on a person's liberty interests is discussed in the
context of abortion, which will be discussed infra. However, it is sufficient
now to note that at least pre-viability, this state interest is not sufficiently
implicated to allow for infringement upon a pregnant woman's right to
have her advance directive honored.8s
2. Equal Protection.-The "right to die," in addition to having due process
implications, also implicates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part,
"[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.""9 While the equal protection guaranteed in the
Fourteenth Amendment "does not take from the States all power of
classification,"' the clause does generally require that the "classifications
made by the state bear an adequate relationship to the purposes the
classifications are purported to serve."'" Certain classifications, however,
are subjected to a more stringent review than this general test.9 When
the government makes a distinction on the basis of alienage, 93 race, 94 or
national origin 95 the Supreme Court has held that strict scrutiny must be
applied, requiring the distinction be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
88 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recognizing "the
right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the State"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) ("For the stage
prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."). But cf
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (holding that the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of
2003 which prohibited D&E abortion pre-viability did not constitute an undue burden upon
a woman's right to an abortion pre-viability).
89 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § i.
90 Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979) (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,314 (1976)).
91 Matchan & Sheffield, supra note 49, at 396.
92 See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
121, 124 (1989) ("[In determining whether a government classification is supported by suf-
ficient justification to satisfy the equal protection clause, one must determine first what kind
of means-end scrutiny is applicable and second whether that test is met. Intensified scrutiny
is applicable where the classification is suspect (or semi-suspect), or the government has in-
fringed a fundamental right, or the classification is somewhat suspect and the interest is some-
what fundamental. Otherwise rationality review applies.").
93 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
94 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944).
95 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
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government interest using the least restrictive means. 96 Strict scrutiny
thus, is a test which "has been satisfied only once in an equal protection
case reviewed by the Supreme Court."97 Additionally, an "intermediate
scrutiny" test is to be applied to distinctions based upon illegitimacy
and gender." Intermediate scrutiny holds that such distinctions will be
found to violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the distinction is
substantially related to an important government interest.99 Classifications
that are not "suspect" or related to sex or illegitimacy are to be judged
under a minimum rationality test, which requires that the distinction only
be rationally related to a legitimate public interest. 10° Undoubtedly, Equal
Protection challenges are won and lost based on the classification of the
distinction made.
a. Why Pregnancy Exemptions Constitute a Distinction Based on Sex. In
order to determine whether or not a pregnancy exemption clause of an
advance directive act violates the Equal Protection Clause, it must first
be determined which of the three tests enunciated above will be applied
to the distinction made. As pregnancy exemptions would only apply to
women, it is clear that either a minimum rationality test would apply (if it
is determined that the classification made is non-suspect) or intermediate
scrutiny if the distinction is held to be based on gender. While it is possible
to argue that the distinction made between pregnant and non-pregnant
people in pregnancy exemption clauses is not rationally related to a
legitimate public interest, 1°1 the Supreme Court has rarely held that this
test is not satisfied, with the state generally coming out as the winner 0 2 As
96 See Palamore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,432-33 (1984).
97 Katherine T Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1532, 1538 (1974) (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214 (holding that national security inter-
ests justified federal internment of Japanese during World War II)).
98 Matchan & Sheffield, supra note 49, at 396-97.
99 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (noting that, in order to meet
the burden of intermediate scrutiny, the party seeking to uphold a statute must show an "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification"); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 2 11- 12 (1977); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 197 (1976); see also Galloway, supra note 92, at 125.
IOO See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 621 (1996) ("We have attempted to reconcile the
principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational
relation to some legitimate end.").
tot See supra notes 43-76 and accompanying text.
102 Butcf Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (holding that a state constitutional amendment which
precluded all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect the status of persons
based on homosexuals, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practice or relationships failed
the minimum rationality test). It may be argued, however, that the pregnancy exemption fails
even minimum rationality with respect to the government interest in the potential life of the
fetus, at least pre-viability. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 ("With respect to the State's
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability.").
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such, in order for the pregnancy exemption to be deemed unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause, a distinction based on pregnancy would
need to be deemed a classification based on sex and intermediate scrutiny
applied.
The consensus among legal scholars is that distinctions based on
pregnancy constitute gender classifications:0 3
Pregnancy's centrality to human reproduction, and hence to women's
traditional role, has made it the basis for rules which express and
reinforce old ideologies about women's proper place. The tangible,
physical nature and high visibility of pregnancy have made such rules
seem natural and appropriate, but upon close examination, the rules are
often only tenuously related to their purposes and are premised on the
very 'old notions' about women that the Supreme Court has ruled will
not justify sex-based legislationY°4
It is argued that a distinction based upon pregnancy divides individuals into
two groups, one containing those who cannot become pregnant, men, and
the other including those who can, women."' 5 In her 1989 article Death with
Dignity: Is There an Exception for Pregnant Women?, Joan Mahoney presented
an analogy which clearly illustrates why pregnancy-based distinctions are
in fact classifications based on sex:
Suppose, for example, that a man has a young son who has developed
leukemia, and that the only possibility of keeping the son alive is to
provide him with a bone marrow transplant from an appropriate relative.
After tests reveal that the father is the only relative whose bone marrow
would save the boy, but before the father can decide whether he
wants to make the donation, the father suffers a cerebral hemorrhage
that leaves him in a persistent vegetative state. The father has left a
living will, making clear his intent to refuse medical treatment in that
situation, and his wife, wishing to carry out his intent, has requested the
hospital to cease all life sustaining treatment. Although the wife also
is concerned with the health of her child, she may have faith that he
will pull through even without the transplant, and she does not want
to violate the husband's bodily rights. Suppose, in addition, that the
doctors determine that the boy is at the wrong stage of treatment for a
transplant, and they seek a court order that would allow them to keep
the father alive over a period of several months and then to extract his
bone marrow and transplant it to the son before the father is allowed to
die. They might even ask that the father be maintained artificially for
103 See Matchan & Sheffield, supra note 49, at 4o1; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §16-29 (2d ed. 1988); Bartlett, supra note 97, at 1557; Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV.
375, 379 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, RethinkingSex andthe Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983
n.107, 988 (1984).
104 Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
mentDebate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 358 (1985).
105 Matchan & Sheffield, supra note 49, at 401.
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some period after the transplant, in case it does not work, so he could
provide more bone marrow for a second attempt."
"[N]o court," Mahoney explained, "has [ever] ordered a competent adult to
donate an organ, or even bone marrow, to save the life fo [sic] another person,
even his or her child."'' 07 Further, based on the Supreme Court's holding in
Cruzan it would seem as though the man would have a constitutional right
to have his living will carried out as the state's interest in protecting his
son, a third party, would not override his right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment.108 The query then, is how does this situation differ from a
pregnant woman in persistent vegetative state who has executed a valid
advance directive prior to coming to lack decisional capacity? If there is
no real distinction, as Mahoney believes there is not, °9 then the distinction
drawn is based upon sex.
b. The Effect of Geduldigv. Aiello. The Supreme Court's holding in Geduldig
v. Aiello 0 presents a potential roadblock to a holding that a distinction
based upon pregnancy constitutes gender classification. In Geduldig, the
Court held that a California disability insurance program's exclusion of
pregnancy and childbirth from coverage did not constitute a distinction
based upon sex but instead simply "divide[d] potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant woman and nonpregnant persons.""' After finding that
the distinction made was not gender-based, the court applied minimum
rationality and found that the insurance scheme did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, as the state of California had "legitimate interests
in maintaining the self-supporting nature of its insurance program,
distributing available resources to keep benefit payments at adequate
levels for disabilities covered rather than to cover all disabilities, and
maintaining the contribution rate at nonburdensome levels"'1 2 and that
these interests provided an "objective and wholly noninvidious basis for
the State's decision not to create a more comprehensive insurance program
1o6 Mahoney, supra note 31, at 23o.
107 Id.; see also In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d. i8o, i8o (Wis. 1975). But see Strunk v. Strunk,
445 S.W.2d 145, I45 (Ky. 1969) (approving organ donation by a mentally handicapped man
based on the court's finding that the donor was very close and dependent upon the donee, his
brother, and he would thus benefit from the brother's survival).
io8 See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
109 Mahoney, supra note 31, at 231 ("In fact, the very idea of maintaining a body in a
'living' state so as to use it for organ transplants is offensive, yet I fail to see the difference
between that and the requirement in living will statutes that pregnant women be kept alive
so that the fetus can be brought to term and delivered.").
i io Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
iii Id. at496 n.zo.
112 Matchan & Sheffield, supra note 49, at 400.
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than it has." '113
Geduldig, however, has been functionally overruled by Newport News
Shipbuilding &Drydock Co. v. E.E.O.C.114 and U.A.W v. Johnson Controls Inc."'
In Newport News, a Title VII case, the Court determined that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act "rejected the test of discrimination employed by the
Court" in General Electric v. Gilbert,'16 a test which the Court recognized in
Geduldig. 7 The Court further pointed out Justice Brennan's and Justice
Stevens' disdain for the Gilbert holding, as they noted that the appropriate
distinction was "between persons who face a risk of pregnancy and those who
do not." '118 Further, in U.A.W v. Johnson Controls Inc., the Court determined
that a policy excluding female employees from certain jobs in an effort to
protect fetuses constituted a distinction based on gender.119 In his majority
opinion, Justice Blackmun noted, "the pregnancy distinction 'classifie[s]
on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity."' 2 0 Justice Blackmun's
conclusion thus "connected childbearing capacity with gender," providing
"the strongest evidence that Geduldig has been overruled.""1
c. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny. Once it is determined that the
pregnancy exemption constitutes a distinction based on sex, intermediate
scrutiny is to be applied to determine whether such an exemption would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.' In order to be found constitutional,
the exemption must be substantially related to an important government
interest."3 As noted, there are a number of state interests implicated in a
person's decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. 14 The first question
is whether or not those interests are sufficiently "important interests."
Although these interests have never been held sufficiently important to
prevent a male from having life-sustaining treatment withdrawn, it may be
assumed that based upon the Supreme Court's analysis in Roe v. Wade and
its progeny, at some point the state's interest in the potential life of a fetus
113 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496.
114 Newport News Shipping & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Opportunity Emp't Comm'n,
462 U.S. 669 (1983).
115 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
1i6 Newport News Shipping &Dry Dock Co., 462 U.S. at 676.
117 Id. at 676-77.
iI8 Id. at 678.
1I9 See UAW, 499 U.S. at l1.
120 Stephanie S. Gold, Note, An Equality Approach to Wrondlul Birth Statutes, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1005, 1026 (1996) (citing UAW, 499 U.S. at 198).
121 Id.(footnotes omitted).
122 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 43-76 and accompanying text.
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may become not only substantially important but even compelling.,25 As
such, if ever presented with a pregnancy exemption clause, the Court may
likely find a sufficiently important government interest in the life of the
fetus, at least after the point of viability."6
The central determination is thus whether or not the exemption is
sufficiently related to this important government interest. In his article
Basic Equal Protection Analysis,"2 7 Russell Galloway, Jr. notes, "[tihe
substantial relation test has been called 'opaque' and has caused confusion
and dispute, but it now appears to be settled that it requires that the
classification be substantially effective and necessary. 1 8 One may in fact
put forth a compelling argument that a pregnancy exemption would be
substantially effective and even necessary to save the life of a fetus. The
problem, however, is that such an exemption sweeps too broadly, as it
encompasses all stages of pregnancy, including points prior to viability of
the fetus. According to the Supreme Court's abortion framework as laid
out in Casey and Roe, the state does not have a sufficient interest in the
potential life of the fetus, at least pre-viability, such that the provision may
pass under intermediate scrutiny.2 9 Even more concerning is the fact that
even if it is determined the state has a sufficiently important interest in the
life of a potential fetus, to which the pregnancy exemption is substantially
related, no Court has ever determined that such a situation warrants
ordering that a male patient's advance directive be ignored in order to serve
the very same interest in life. 3 ' Two options seem to exist: either the Court
must hold that a male patient's advance directive may also be ignored in
order to protect the life of another, a decision which seems to oppose cases
such as Cruzan which declare a person has a constitutional right to forgo
life-sustaining medical treatment,"' or that the gender distinction made
with pregnancy exemptions are not sufficiently substantially related to
preserving the potential life of a fetus.
125 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (stating that, with respect to the State's im-
portant and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (reaffirming Roe's holding that rec-
ognized "a woman's right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability and to obtain
it without undue interference from the State, whose pre-viability interests are not strong
enough to support an abortion prohibition or the imposition of substantial obstacles to the
woman's effective right to elect the procedure").
126 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.
127 Galloway, supra note 92, at 121.
128 Id. at 143-44 (footnote omitted).
129 See supra note 123.
130 See supra note 96.




A. The Current State of the Law Under Roe, Casey, and Gonzalez
Also implicated in pregnancy exemptions to advance directive acts are
a women's reproductive rights. By prohibiting the execution of a valid
advance directive withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment in the
instance of a pregnant woman, states that have enacted advance directive
acts with pregnancy exemptions essentially proscribe a formerly competent
woman's ability to abort her fetus. The right to reproduce, or rather not to
reproduce, finds its roots to some extent in the right to privacy found in the
"penumbras and emanations" of the Bill of Rights. 3 The Supreme Court
in Griswoldv. Connecticut, through its invalidation of a Connecticut statute's
prohibition on the use of contraceptives by a married couple, recognized
this right to privacy,'33 which was further extended to non-married couples
in Eisenstadtv. Baird.'34 This right to privacy was next found broad enough
to include a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy in Roe v. Wade.
3 s
Although the right to privacy was found to be a fundamental right 3 6 in Roe
and its predecessors, the Court held in Roe that, like all other fundamental
rights, this right must be balanced against state interests, and only when
an infringement of such fundamental rights is found to be necessary and
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest will it be
found constitutional. 37 The Court in Roe held that post-viability of a fetus,
a state may completely proscribe abortion except where it is necessary "in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother."'38 This essentially amounted to holding that post-viability,
the state's interests become sufficiently compelling to warrant complete
infringement on a woman's right to abortion. Pre-viability, the state's
interests were found not to be sufficiently compelling. Prior to the end
of the first trimester the abortion decision should be left entirely up to
the pregnant woman and her attending physician, 3 9 and "subsequent to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its
132 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965). Further, the right to privacy is
grounded in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (right to pri-
vate possession of obscene matter), the Fourth Amendment, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)
(right to walk down the street undisturbed), and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923) (right to teach one's children).
133 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484, 494-95.
134 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,447 (1972).
135 Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
136 Id. at 152.
137 Id. at i55 n.ii.
138 Id. at i65.
139 See id. at 164.
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interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, [only] regulate
the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.''"0
The rule in Roe was altered slightly by a plurality holding in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,'41 where the Court did
away with Roe' trimester framework and held that although a woman
has the right to terminate her pregnancy pre-viability, the state, with its
"concurrent interest" in the potentiality of life, may implement measures
"designed to ensure that the woman's choice is informed, so long as these
measures do not pose an undue burden on her right."'' 41 Post-viability, the
rule remains that the state may completely proscribe abortion, except where
necessary to promote the life or health of the mother. 43 Casey provides
some guidance as to what exactly would constitute an undue burden, or
"substantial obstacle,"144 by invalidating a provision of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act of 1982, which required spousal notification prior to
the performance of an abortion procedure. 141 Conversely, the Court's 2007
decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, concerning the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of
2003, provides an illustration of what does not constitute such a substantial
burden.' 4" The Act, which banned intact D & E abortion' 47 without an
exception for the life and health of the pregnant woman, was held not to
constitute an undue burden on a woman's pre-viability right to obtain an
abortion.
148
B. Applying the Current Framework
In order to determine whether or not pregnancy exemption clauses
140 Id.
141 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845 (1992).
142 Alexis Gregorian, Post-Mortem Pregnancy: A Proposed Methodology for the Resolution of
Conflicts Over Whether a Brain Dead Pregnant Woman Should be Maintained on Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 401,416 (zoIo) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
143 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (affirming Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
144 Id. at 877.
145 See id. at 893-95.
146 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, I68 (2007).
147 The Court in Gonzales describes intact D & E abortion as follows:
Intact D & E, like regular D & E, begins with dilation of the cervix. Sufficient
dilation is essential for the procedure. To achieve intact extraction some doctors
thus may attempt to dilate the cervix to a greater degree. This approach has been
called "serial" dilation. Doctors who attempt at the outset to perform intact D &
E may dilate for two full days or use up to 25 osmotic dilators. In an intact D & E
procedure the doctor extracts the fetus in a way conducive to pulling out its entire
body, instead of ripping it apart.
Id. at 137 (citations omitted).
148 Id. at 167-68.
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present in many state advance directive acts are constitu.tionally
permissible under the Supreme Court's abortion framework, it is necessary
to first determine whether or not the exemptions constitute an "undue
burden" on a woman's right to abort her fetus pre-viability. 49 In addition,
an analysis of the exemptions should be made in the context of a viable
fetus. As the Court has consistently held, a state's interest in preserving the
potential life of the fetus is sufficiently compelling to outweigh a pregnant
woman's right to abort a fetus post-viability. This post-viability analysis
thus hinges on a determination of whether the state interest continues to
be sufficiently compelling in the context of pregnancy exemptions and end
of life decision-making.
1. Pre-Viabilily.-Pre-viability, a state may not completely proscribe a
woman's decision to obtain an abortion, and any regulations imposed must
not constitute an undue burden to the decision.5 This undue burden test
consists of determining whether or not the regulation imposed constitutes
a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus."'' In contrast, "[r]egulations which do no more than
create a'structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian
of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise
of the right to choose."' 2 The spousal notification provision invalidated
in Casey is a clear illustration of what does constitute an undue burden,
while the prohibition of a certain form of abortion pre-viability as found in
Gonzales v. Carhart53 serves as a clear illustration of a state regulation that
does not constitute a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman obtaining an
abortion. The problem with pregnancy exemption clauses is that, instead of
placing specifications or regulations upon a woman's right to abort her fetus
pre-viability, the exemption completely prohibits a woman from exercising
her right to abortion no matter what stage of viability the fetus is in when
the advance directive is to become effective. Unlike Carhart, where the Act
at issue prohibited a certain type of abortion, but spoke to no other abortion
options," 4 pregnancy exemption clauses completely proscribe a formerly
competent person's wish to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment,
which would lead to abortion of the fetus. 5 Thus, at least at points prior to
149 See supra notes 139-4o and accompanying text.
150 See id.
151 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
152 Id.
153 See supra notes 129-3 o and accompanying text.
154 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2oo7).
155 See Ai.-. CODE § zz-8A-4(e) (LexisNexis 2oo6) ("The advance directive for health
care of a declarant who is known by the attending physician to be pregnant should have no
effect during the course of the declarant's pregnancy,"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.625 (West
[Vol. I00
FORCING LIFE ON THE DEAD
the viability of the fetus, pregnancy exemptions seem to unduly burden a
woman's right to an abortion under the framework provided by the Court
in Roe, Casey, and Carhart. As such, these statutes are unconstitutional as
applied to a pregnant woman, pre-viability.
2. Post-Viability.-Within the Supreme Court's abortion framework, the
Court has consistently held that post-viability of a fetus, the state's interest
in potential life is sufficiently compelling to justify complete prohibition
of abortion procedures. 5 6 This would seem to completely preclude any
finding that pregnancy exemption clauses are unconstitutional as applied
to a pregnant woman's right to terminate her pregnancy post-viability.
It should be noted, however, that thus far every abortion case before
the Supreme Court has dealt with weighing a woman's right to privacy
against the state's interest in the potential life of a fetus in the context of
a presumably healthy woman.'57 Yet to be determined by the Court is just
how compelling the state's interest in the potential life of a fetus is in the
context of a dying woman.
According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, "the State's interest
Contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of
bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes
a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State interest."'158
As one commentator has put it, "[t]here is little doubt that keeping an
incompetent woman alive against her will is an invasive procedure when
her prognosis is dim,"'59 a circumstance required by most advance directive
statutes' 60 before a person's wishes will be enforced. 6' Further, in the
context of abortion analysis, the state's interest in the potential life of the
fetus is generally weighed only against the pregnant woman's abortion
rights. In the context of a pregnant woman who has drafted an otherwise
valid advance directive indicating that life-sustaining medical treatment
be withdrawn, the right to refuse such unwanted medical treatment and
the right to die are also implicated. Logically, how compelling a state's
interest is in the potential life would seem to lessen as other fundamental
rights weighing against this interest also became implicated. In the context
of a dying pregnant woman, it is no longer a simple question of whether
zo) ("If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my attending
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my pregnancy.");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (2002) ("If a declarant has been diagnosed as pregnant, the Dec-
laration is not effective during the course of the declarant's pregnancy.").
156 See supra notes 13 1-45 and accompanying text.
157 See id.
158 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
159 Burch, supra note 5, at 547.




the state's interest in potential life outweighs a woman's privacy right
to abortion alone, but also her right to withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment.
While the Supreme Court has not specifically balanced a person's right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment against the state's interest in
potential life, the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has done so in In re A.C. 6 As previously noted, the Court of Appeals held
that a state's interest in the potential life of a fetus was not sufficiently
compelling to override a competent patient's decision to forego a certain
medical procedure.163 Although the court in In reA.C. also noted that it did
not "quite foreclose the possibility that a conflicting state interest may be
so compelling that the patient's wishes must yield,"'164 a scenario where a
pregnant woman has sought to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment
through an advance directive would not seem to constitute such a situation.
A terminally ill pregnant woman who had previously written out her wishes
in an advance directive would not be different in any material respect from
the woman at issue in In re A.C., who had only days to live when it was




Pregnancy exemption clauses similar to the one found in the Kentucky
Living Will Directive Act violate the Constitution on two fronts. First, such
exemptions, in staying a competent individual's right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, violate a person's right under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to forego unwanted medical procedures.
As well, the exemptions, in distinguishing between those who can bear
children (women) and those who cannot (mostly men), contravene the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because such
distinction is not substantially related to an important government interest,
it fails intermediate scrutiny. As a result, it is unconstitutional.
Pregnant women's reproductive rights are also infringed by pregnancy
exemption clauses. The exemptions certainly constitute an undue burden
on a woman's right to procure an abortion pre-viability by completely
eliminating the possibility of obtaining the procedure. Additionally,
post-viability, the government's interest in protecting the potential life
of the fetus is not sufficiently compelling to override a woman's right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment. Even if the state's interest in the
potential life of the fetus is found sufficiently compelling, it remains to
162 Seesupra notes 49-55.
163 Id.
164 In reA.C., 573 A.2d.1235, 1252 (D.C. 199o) (en banc).
165 See id. at 1237.
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be determined why the same restrictions are not imposed on the advance
directives of males, if doing so would allow the life of another person to
be preserved. Certainly, if the constitutionality of pregnancy exemption
clauses in advance directive acts is ever challenged before Kentucky courts,
there exists a strong argument that such clauses violate due process, equal
protection, and the reproductive rights of women.

